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JURY TRIAL FOR JUVENILES: EQUAL PROTECTION
AND CALIFORNIA COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
In California three different procedures are available to deal
with persons who, though not necessarily criminals, may present a
danger to society or to themselves. Known generally as "commitment
proceedings," these procedures allow suits for involuntary commitment
of three classes of persons, (1) adults or minors who are mentally or
physically disabled, disordered, retarded, or who are narcotic addicts;1
(2) minors who are juvenile delinquents;2 and (3) adults who have
reached majority but who are not yet wholly rehabilitated from their
commitment as juveniles. 3 Although there are procedural differences
among the proceedings, the general purpose is to rehabilitate the indi-
vidual and to protect society during such rehabilitation.
In the recent case of In re Gary W.,4 the California Supreme
Court declared that, as a matter of equal protection, the legislative
scheme which governs involuntary recommitment of adults who are not
yet rehabilitated from their commitment as juveniles was discrimina-
tory, and thus invalid, because such recommitment was allowed with-
out affording a right to trial by a jury while other similar commitment
proceedings do provide for jury trial. The California court did not
directly hold that equal protection requires a trial by jury for all commit-
ment proceedings; however, the court's reasoning regarding equal pro-
tection would appear to be equally applicable to certain other commit-
ment proceedings which do not presently provide for jury trials.
5
A suggested argument, based primarily on the equal protection
analysis of In re Gary W., would be as follows: if the legislature in
creating statutory commitment proceedings incorporates a fundamental
right such as trial by jury into some of the proceedings, it must do so
in all similar proceedings unless it can demonstrate a compelling state
interest for not according such a right in particular proceedings. At
the present time, involuntary commitment of juveniles is one of the few
civil proceedings which still authorizes involuntary commitment with-
out affording the right of a trial by jury. Although the denial of a jury
trial in juvenile proceedings has been held not to be a denial of due
1. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 3000-200, 5000-401, 6250-825 (West 1966),
as amended, (Supp. 1971)).
2. See id. §§ 500-945.
3. See id. §§ 1800-03.
4. 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
5. See id. at 305, 486 P.2d at 1208,96 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
process, the constitutionality of denying this right to juveniles as a mat-
ter of equal protection has not yet been decided in California.
This note will analyze the equal protection reasoning of the court
in In re Gary W. in order to determine the extent and breadth of its
holding and to determine if the above hypothesis is correct. First,
however, the various California involuntary commitment statutes will
be briefly discussed in order to supply the context within which the court
applied the equal protection doctrine.
Involuntary Civil Commitment in California
California has an extensive statutory framework for the involun-
tary commitment of individuals through civil proceedings. Although
there are many separate code provisions, each tailored to meet a par-
ticular problem, most of the sections fall into one of the three general
categories previously mentioned-disordered persons, juvenile delin-
quents, and recommittees.
Conunitment of Persons with Mental or Physical Defects
The largest of these groups authorizes the commitment of persons
due to a particular mental or physical defect. Commitment for involun-
tary treatment under this category is generally authorized when the state
has demonstrated the existence of a mental or physical condition which
is potentially dangerous to the community or to the individual himself.6
To fully understand the nature of this type of commitment, a brief ex-
amination of the various procedures involved-which, of course, may
vary somewhat for particular types of individuals-is necessary.
First, involuntary treatment may be administered to persons who
are gravely disabled, or who, as a result of mental disorder 7 or inebria-
tion,8 are dangerous to themselves or to othersY
6. These provisions include the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE §§ 5000-599 (West Supp. 1971), and other closely related legislation.
Id. 3000-09 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971) (narcotics addicts); id. §§ 5150-56
(West Supp. 1971) (gravely disabled); id. §§ 5170-76 (inebriates); id. §§ 5260-68
(suicidal); id. §§ 6300-30 (mentally disordered sex offenders); id. §§ 6500-12 (men-
tally retarded).
7. Id. § 5150.
8. Id. § 5170.
9. Involuntary commitment procedures for these individuals may be initiated
by any interested person who files a petition requesting such commitment with the
superior court in the county where the individual lives. Id. § 5201. If the court is
satisfied that the petition is valid, the person named therein is ordered to undergo a
preliminary evaluation which cannot extend beyond seventy-two hours. Id. § 5250.
If the professional staff of the agency or facility providing the preliminary evaluation
finds that the individual is in need of intensive care in accordance with the require-
ments of the statute, the individual is committed for more extended treatment. The
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Another type of disordered person who may be subject to involun-
tary treatment is a person who has such a predeliction to commit sexual
offenses that he is deemed to present a danger to the health and safety
of others.10 Included with this class are persons who have been previ-
ously convicted of sex offenses or persons over sixteen years of age who
have been adjudged wards of the juvenile court and appear to be po-
tential sex offenders.1 ' A third type of disordered person subject to in-
voluntary commitment for treatment is one who is addicted to narcotics
or repeatedly uses narcotics, or who may be in imminent danger of
becoming addicted to narcotics. 2
A mentally retarded person may also be subject to involuntary
commitment. Any person found to be mentally retarded to the extent
that he is incapable of handling his own affairs, or of being taught to
do so, may be committed to a state hospital for care. 3
In all of the commitment proceedings involving these persons the
place and duration of the commitment may vary, depending upon the
type of treatment needed and the particular behavior of the individual.
Generally, however, the Department of Mental Hygiene determines the
length of treatment and the place of institutionalization.' 4
Because of the involuntary nature of certain of the proceedings
described above, the legislature has provided persons subject to com-
term of commitment may last from a brief stay of fourteen days to an extended period
measured in ninety day intervals. Additional treatment may be ordered, not to exceed
ninety days, if the patient has inflicted or has threatened to inflict harm to another
while in custody. Id. § 5300. At the end of ninety days the treatment is termi-
nated unless a new petition for additional treatment is filed. Id. § 5304.
10. Id. § 6302.
11. Id. § 6304. Commitment of these persons for treatment may be initiated
by the judge, by the prosecuting official, or even by the sick person himself. Id.
§ 6302(a), (b). In cases involving a victim who is a child under fourteen years
of age, and a defendant who has been convicted of a felony sex offense or of a
second misdemeanor sex offense, the judge must adjourn the criminal proceeding or
certify the defendant for examination and hearing. Id. § 6302(b), (c). If the de-
fendant is found to be a mentally disordered sex offender, the court may commit
him to a state hospital for an indeterminate period. Id. § 6326.
12. Id. § 3100. The commitment for treatment may be initiated by any inter-
ested person, id., and may last as long as ten years. Id. § 3201 (West 1966).
Treatment is administered by a narcotics detention facility. Id. § 3001. If a person
has been convicted in a criminal proceeding, the judge may order the defendant to
undergo an examination for possible commitment to a narcotics detention facility.
Id. § 3050 (West Supp. 1971).
13. Id. § 6500. The petition for the commitment of a mentally retarded person
may be initiated by certain interested persons enumerated in the statute. Id. § 6502.
As in the case of other mentally disordered persons, the treatment may last from an
initial period of fourteen days to a prolonged commitment measured in ninety day
intervals. Id. § 6551.
14. See id. § 4100.
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mitment with many statutory procedural protections. For example, per-
sons subject to commitment because of a physical or mental problem
are accorded a hearing "in accordance with constitutional guarantees
of due process of law,"'" which includes the right to counsel, the right
to notice of the hearing, the right to subpoena witnesses, the right to
cross examine witnesses, the right to appeal, and the right to trial by
jury.' 6 A notable exception to the extension of rights in this group are
the proceedings for the commitment of the mentally retarded who have
been afforded only limited protections. 17
Another important aspect of the statutes which provide for the in-
voluntary commitment of individuals with a mental or physical problem
is that they are applicable to individuals of all ages. The legislature
explicitly provided that any person may be committed under the above
provisions-minors and adults alike are amenable to the commitment
proceedings in the disordered persons group.' 8
Connitment of Juvenile Delinquents
The second general category of commitment proceedings involves
juvenile delinquents. The California legislature has enacted certain
statutes through which the state may assume control of problem chil-
dren. 9 The primary responsibility, at least for the most difficult cases,
15. Id. § 5303.
16. These rights are given to imminently dangerous persons (due to mental
illness, inebriation or suicidal tendencies) in sections 5302 and 5303. Mentally dis-
ordered sex offenders are given these rights in sections 6313 and 6314. Narcotic
addicts are given these protections in sections 3104, 3105 and 3108.
17. The only rights afforded by the legislature to the mentally retarded are the
right of the hearing and the right to compel the attendance of witnesses. Id.
§§ 6504-507.
18. Each of these statutes describes the persons who are amenable to commit-
ment. For example, in discussing the term "narcotic addict," section 3009 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code refers to "any person, adult or minor, who is addicted
to the unlawful use of any narcotic . . ." (emphasis added); sections 5150 and 5170
provide that "any person" is amenable to commitment as a dangerous or gravely dis-
abled individual or as a person suffering from mental retardation (emphasis added);
section 6300 defines individuals amenable to commitment as a mentally disordered sex
offender as "any person who by reason of mental defect, disease or disorder, is pre-
disposed to the commission of sexual offenses. ... (emphasis added).
19. Id. §§ 500-996 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971). The two sections
dealing with adjudication of a minor as a ward of the juvenile court are sections 601
and 602. Section 601 authorizes wardship for "[a]ny person under the age of 21 years
who persistently or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or
directions of his parents, guardian, custodian or school authorities, or who is beyond the
control of such person, or any person who is a habitual truant from school within the
meaning of any law of this State, or who from any cause is in danger of leading an
idle, dissollute, lewd, or immoral life ....... Section 602 authorizes wardship for
"[a]ny person under the age of 21 years who violates any law of this State . . . de-
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is invested in the California Youth Authority.20 Any person under
twenty-one years of age who violates a criminal statute, may be com-
mitted to the authority after being adjudged a ward of the court.
2
1
Furthermore, a juvenile who disobeys an order of the juvenile court
after being adjudged a ward may also be committed to the authority.
22
On the surface, the commitment of persons with mental or physical
conditions and the commitment of juveniles appear quite unrelated.
However, the legislature has provided a procedure whereby individuals
may be transferred from the juvenile court or Youth Authority to the
Department of Mental Hygiene." Both the probation officer of the ju-
venile court and the director of the Youth Authority have been given
the express power to authorize involuntary treatment for individuals
under their jurisdiction. 24 Thus, there is a direct link between the De-
partment of Mental Hygiene, the juvenile court, and the Youth Author-
ity.
In providing for such transfers, the legislature has manifested an
intent to insure that the individual receives complete treatment through-
out the period of involuntary commitment. The legislature has also
provided certain statutory procedural protections to those facing possi-
ble commitment under these juvenile statutes which are quite similar
to the rights granted under the commitment statutes for disordered and
disabled individuals.2 5 There is one notable exception, however; the
fining crime or who, after having been found by the juvenile court to be a person
described by Section 601, fails to obey any lawful order of the juvenile court ... .
20. Id. § 1000 (West 1966). The juvenile court may commit less serious cases,
particularly those under section 601, to a "county juvenile home, ranch, camp, or
forestry camp," pursuant to section 730.
21. Id. § 731.
22. Id. One example would be a minor who habitually refuses to obey his par-
ents. Another example might be a youth who is in serious danger of leading an im-
moral life. The proceeding to declare the minor a ward of the court is initiated by the
filing of a petition by the probation officer of the juvenile court, id. § 650, or by
certification from the superior court. Id. H8 603-04. After the commitment of the
juvenile to the Youth Authority, a determination is made as to the particular educa-
tional and training institution in which he will be placed for rehabilitation. Id. § 1004.
The term of such commitment is limited by statute. Id. §§ 1760.7-71 (West Supp.
1971).
23. Id. § 1756.
24. Id. This special treatment can last only for the length of the commit-
ment to the Youth Authority. When the time for discharge from the authority is
near, a petition may be filed to commit this person directly to the Department of
Mental Hygiene in accordance with the various statutes.
25. A juvenile is afforded the rights to counsel, to notice of hearing, to sub-
poena, to cross-examine and to appeal by sections 625, 630, 634, and 800 respectively.
Unlike any of the other involuntary commitment proceedings, the juvenile court de-
fendant is expressly accorded the privilege against self incrimination and must be ad-
vised of his constitutional rights at the time he is taken into custody. Id. §§ 625,
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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
right to a jury trial is not provided under the juvenile commitment
statutes..
26
Recommitment of Unrehabilitated Juveniles
The third general category of commitment statutes-recommit-
ment of unrehabilitated juveniles who have attained the age of auto-
matic release-is actually a proceeding within the scope of the Youth
Authority. On the application of the authority, the court which origi-
nally committed the ward may order recommitment before the time of
his automatic discharge.27 The court holds a supplementary hearing
to determine if the release of the unrehabilitated ward would be danger-
ous to the community because of the particular mental or physical de-
ficiency involved.2 18  The supplemental proceeding is a wholly inde-
pendent proceeding initiated by the Youth Authority to consider the
individual's personal history and response to treatment.
The recommitment proceeding for such juveniles is not initiated
until the youth is statutorily entitled to automatic discharge from com-
mitment-for juveniles, this occurs at age twenty-one. 29  Only individ-
uals who have attained their majority are amenable to the recommit-
ment proceedings; this is true whether the ward was directly com-
mitted from a juvenile court adjudication or was transferred after a su-
perior court conviction. 0 The legislature treats the recommitment pro-
ceedings very much like the juvenile court proceedings with respect
to the extension of procedural protections, 3' and, as in the juvenile
proceedings, there is no statutory right to trial by jury. The validity
of such recommitment proceedings without the right of jury trial was
the issue before the court in In re Gary W.
702.5 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971). The primary reason for according
these rights to juveniles is that most of the findings of fact made by the judge may
lead to a determination of quasi-criminal guilt therefore necessitating some of the
fundamental protections of a criminal proceeding.
26. It was the validity of the omission of the right to a jury trial in supple-
mental proceedings that was in issue in In re Gary W.
27. Id. § 1802 (West 1966).
28. Id. § 1800. Recommitment of the individual for further rehabilitation is
limited to two years by statute; however, at the expiration of the two year period the
authority may again apply to the court for additional recommitment. Id. § 1802.
These applications may be renewed at two year intervals until such time as the ward
is not deemed dangerous to the public. Id.
29. Id. § 1769.
30. Id. § 1731.5 (West Supp. 1971).
31. In the recommitment proceedings, the right to counsel, the right to notice
of the hearing, the right to subpoena, the right to cross-examine and the right to
appeal are expressly granted in sections 1801 and 1803 of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code.
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Common Purpose and Intent of the Various Commitment Provisions
Thus far, the discussion has indicated certain of the identifying
characteristics of the specific provisions of California's involuntary civil
commitment proceedings. The various statutes were categorized into
three groups to emphasize the substantive provisions of the various pro-
ceedings. Many of the minor differences in the various statutes are
primarily attributable to the mechanics of a functioning civil commit-
ment system, since each statute is tailored to meet a specific problem.
However, functional differences should not be construed as a manifes-
tation of a dissimilar intent or purpose within the context of the general
commitment system. Careful examination of the various commit-
ment statutes reveals the existence of a common legislative purpose
and intent within the overall commitment system.
32
The primary purpose of all the commitment statutes appears to be
the rehabilitation and care of the individual, and a secondary purpose
of protecting the public from potential dangers created by such an
individual. The primary purpose of the commitment proceedings in-
volving the "imminently dangerous" person or the mentally disordered
sex offender is manifested by legislative declarations of the
[need to] provide prompt evaluation and treatment of persons
with serious mental disorders . . . [and] to guarantee and protect
public safety . . . [and to] provide individualized treatment . . .
for gravely disabled persons. .... 33
The purpose of the commitment proceedings involving narcotics of-
fenders is phrased in terms of "control, confinement . . . education,
treatment and rehabilitation."3 4  The civil commitment proceeding is
the method utilized by the state to gain control over the individual in
order to fulfill its obligations.
Similarly, the language of the statute creating the juvenile court
suggests that the basic intent of the legislature was to provide rehabilita-
tion and care for problem minors-whether they were subject to com-
mitment proceedings or not.35 The statute refers to the need to pro-
32. See text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
33. CAL. WBLF. & INST'NS CODE § 5001 (West Supp. 1971). The legislative
intent is to provide prompt evaluations and treatment of persons with serious mental
disorders or impaired by chronic alcoholism, and to provide individualized treatment,
supervision and placement services by a conservatorship program for gravely disabled
persons. (This section includes imminently dangerous persons and mentally disor-
dered sex offenders.)
34. Id. § 3001 (West 1966): 'The narcotic detention, treatment and rehabilita-
tion facility . . . shall be one . . . whose principal purpose shall be the receiving,
control, confinement, employment, education, treatment and rehabilitation of persons
under the custody of the Department of Corrections . . . who are or have been ad-
dicted to narcotics or who by reason of repeated use of narcotics are in imminent
danger of becoming addicted."
35. Id. § 502.
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vide "such care and guidance. . . as will serve. . . the welfare of the
minor and the best interests of the State."36  Also, the express intent of
the legislature in creating the Youth Authority was to provide an alterna-
tive to incarceration of the youth as a criminal and to protect society by
substituting training and rehabilitative treatment for retributive punish-
ment.17 Again, the emphasis is placed upon rehabilitation and care for
the individual and society.
Thus, it may be seen that a common purpose pervades these stat-
utes holding them together as a unified legislative scheme of civil com-
mitment. However, the dual purpose of the legislative scheme-re-
habilitation and the care and protection of the public-may not always
be weighted equally in certain of the commitment proceedings. For
example, a person incurably insane may be committed if he poses a
danger to the public even though he may be getting expert care at home.
On the other hand, for another insane person commitment may provide
care not otherwise available and may also provide training to rehabili-
tate the individual. Similarly, the habitually truant minor who is com-
mitted to the Youth Authority for disobeying an order of the juvenile
court, may receive more of a benefit in the way of rehabilitation and
care than will the general public in terms of protection. These few
examples should demonstrate that while it may be possible to point to
the commitment proceedings provided by statute in a specific case and
label the statute primarily as protective in nature as opposed to re-
habilitative in nature, any such labeling should not obscure the dual
purpose served by the overall commitment system when the statutes
are considered as a whole.
The California Supreme Court in In re Gary W. also appears to
have assumed that the involuntary commitment statutes form a cohesive
unit which was created by the state for the welfare of its citizens.3
This assumption forms the underlying basis of the court's equal protec-
tion argument for allowing a jury trial in the recommitment proceed-
ings in In. re Gary W. 9  If the court was correct in its assumption-
that the civil commitment proceedings are all part of the same unit-
the reasoning of the court in In re Gary W. would appear to also justify
the granting of the right of a jury trial to minors involved in the civil
36. "The purpose of [the juvenile court law] is to secure for each minor under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance . . . as will serve the
spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of
the State ....... Id.
37. Id. § 1700: "The purpose of [the Youth Authority] is to protect society
more effectively by substituting for retributive punishment methods of training and
treatment directed toward the correction and rehabilitation of young persons found
guilty of public offenses."
38. 5 Cal. 3d at 304, 486 P.2d at 1207, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
39. Id.
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commitment proceedings of the juvenile court. The following discus-
sion will review the court's reasoning in In re Gary W. and will con-
sider such reasoning in terms of the right to jury trial for juveniles.
In re Gary W.: The Court's Decision
The petitioner in In re Gary W., first became involved with the
juvenile court and the Youth Authority in 1959, when he was eleven
years of age. At that time he appeared before the juvenile court upon
allegations that he was a dependent child,40 received brief counseling
and was subsequently released. When a second dependency petition
was filed in 1960, the petitioner was declared a ward of the court and
was sent to a child care center but was soon released. In 1963 the
petitioner was again declared a ward of the court 4' because he had par-
ticipated in acts of sodomy with his half-sisters, and he was placed in
another rehabilitation center, but was subsequently released. In 1967
when the petitioner was nineteen years of age, another petition for com-
mitment was filed alleging that the petitioner had been involved in at-
tempted acts of sodomy and sexual intercourse with a seven year old girl.
After a hearing in the juvenile court, the petitioner was committed to
the Youth Authority.
After nearly two years petitioner's case was reviewed by the au-
thority which determined that he should not be granted a parole. In-
stead, the authority ordered that the petitioner undergo mental obser-
vation at a state hospital for a ninety day period. The hospital diag-
nosed the petitioner's problem as "female pedophilia"-love of little
girls-and asserted that he posed a danger to the general public.
By this time the petitioner was approaching his twenty-first birth-
day which would automatically qualify him for discharge from cus-
tody.42 However, because of the hospital's diagnosis of "female ped-
ophilia," the Youth Authority filed a petition for recommitment of the
40. Brief for Respondent at 5-7, In re Gary W., No. 70-507 (Ct. App., 2d
Dist., filed Oct. 19, 1970). CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600 (West 1966) defines a
dependent child as "[a]ny person under the age of 21... :
"(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and has no
parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exercise or capable of
exercising such care or control, or has no parent or guardian actually exercising such
care or control.
"(b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided with the necessities of life, or
who is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode, or whose home is an
unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty, or depravity of either of his parents,
or of his guardian or other person in whose custody or care he is.
"(c) Who is physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or physical
deficiency, disorder or abnormality."
41. See note 27 & accompanying text supra.
42. See note 50 & accompanying text supra.
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petitioner for a period of two years.43 In the petition, the authority
alleged that the release of petitioner from custody at the normal time
prescribed in the statute would be "physically dangerous to the public
due to his mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormal-
ity. ... .,,44
During the recommitment proceedings, the petitioner asked for a
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he was twenty-one years of
age and the Youth Authority no longer had jurisdiction over him; the
writ was denied by the superior court, sitting as a juvenile court, and
the request of the authority to recommit the petitioner for an additional
two year period was sustained. The petitioner had vigorously objected
during the proceeding that he had been denied proper discovery proce-
dures and had been denied his right to a jury trial. The petitioner ap-
pealed the recommitment order to the Court of Appeal for the Second
District, where he reasserted his contentions that he had been denied his
rights of discovery and jury trial. In a brief written opinion the appel-
late court accepted the petitioner's contentions and reversed the order
of the lower courts.4 5
The state requested a hearing by the Supreme Court of California
and it was granted. In the supreme court, the petitioner4" contended
that the involuntary commitment proceedings-codified in sections
1800 through 1803 of the Welfare and Institutions Code-constituted a
denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and a dep-
rivation of liberty under the California Constitution.47 The alleged
denial of equal protection was premised on the fact that certain of the
commitment proceedings provided the right to jury trial while others
did not. In addition, the petitioner made the following arguments be-
fore the court: (1) confinement of Youth Authority wards under the
recommitment statutes constituted "cruel and unusual punishment,"
(2) the juvenile court order was not supported by substantial evidence,
43. See note 47 infra.
44. 5 Cal. 3d at 301, 486 P.2d at 1205, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 5 (quoting a petition of
the Youth Athority).
45. In re Gary W., Crim. No. 70-507 (Ct. App., 2d Dist., filed Oct. 19,
1970). The appellate court theorized: "Were we to hold a jury trial is not constitu-
tionally required for a commitment hearing conducted [under CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE §§ 1800-03 (West 1966)], it would mean that in this state a minor, who was
initially committed by a juvenile court without the benefit of a trial or who was con-
victed of a relatively minor offense, could be held in custody for the rest of his life
without ever having the right to a jury trial at any stage of his incarceration as an
adult. We cannot subscribe to this regressive proposition." Id. at 4-5.
46. Throughout the California Supreme Court decision Gary W. was termed the
"appellant" and that is the designation adopted by this note.
47. 5 Cal. 3d at 299, 486 P.2d at 1204, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 4; see CAL. CONSI.
art. 1, §§ 11, 21.
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and (3) he had erroneously been denied the right to pretrial discovery
and to subpoena out-of-county witnesses.48
The court summarily dismissed the "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" argument, and noted the "demonstrably civil purposes" of the
recommitment proceedings. 49  The court also cited the
absence of any evidence that persons committed [under the re-
commitment statutes] are incarcerated in penal institutions among
the general prison population, or are customarily detained without
treatment. .... 50
The court refused to consider the petitioner's arguments regarding the
discovery and subpoena issues; however, it discussed the scope of
these rights in the proceedings as a guide for the juvenile court to
which the case was remanded. 51
The petitioner's equal protection argument was more favorably
received. It was premised on a showing that the legislature had cre-
ated an extensive involuntary commitment scheme which included the
recommitment proceedings.5" The petitioner argued that since the leg-
islature had expressly incorporated the right to jury trial into many of
the commitment proceedings, 5 denial of a jury trial was unconstitu-
tional unless a rational distinction could be drawn between the recom-
mitment proceedings and the other commitment proceedings.54 The
48. 5 Cal. 3d at 299, 486 P.2d at 1204, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
49. Id. at 302, 486 P.2d at 1206, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 309, 486 P.2d at 1211, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 11: Discussing the rights avail-
able in supplementary proceedings, the court noted: "[A]lthough [recommitment
proceedings] are not juvenile proceedings, and are not criminal, the same dis-
covery rights should be available to adults subject to commitment as are extended to
juveniles and to defendants in criminal prosecutions....
... The narrow issue [in this recommitment proceedings] and the need for
expeditious adjudication suggest that it is not unreasonable to require a showing of
relevance and necessity as a prerequisite to a discovery order." Id. at 309-10, 486 P.2d
at 1211, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 11. Out-of-county subpoenas are available in the recommit-
ment proceedings, and as in discovery procedures, a showing of relevance and
necessity is a prequisite to issuance of the subpoena. Gary had requested broad dis-
covery rights including, mailing address, and professional status of all those who ex-
amined him plus the names of the Youth Authority board members present when it
was decided he should be recommitted. The court concluded that in the absence of a
showing of relevance and necessity, the rights of discovery should be limited.
"Inasmuch as the question of whether a defendant is physically dangerous because of
physical or mental abnormality can be anticipated to be a medical, psychiatric, or
psychological judgment, discovery of matters going beyond the basis of the anticipated
expert testimony is unnecessary." Id. at 311, 486 P.2d at 212-13, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
12-13.
52. Id. at 304, 486 P.2d at 1207, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
53. Id. at 305, 486 P.2d at 1208, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
54. Id.
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state, on the other hand, had argued that "the legislative classification,
being neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, [could] not effect a denial of
the equal protection of the laws;" 55 however, the state failed to present
any evidence to substantiate this argument.
The appellants' equal protection argument was, therefore, pre-
mised on the contention that a rational distinction must exist in order
to sustain the legislative classification. However, the court applied an
even more stringent test and held that the omission of the right of trial
by jury was not a "mere procedural difference" 51 in the statutes, but
rather the deprivation of a fundamental right.57 Under this test, the
state was required not only to show that there was a rational distinction
in the various commitment proceedings, but also had to demonstrate a
compelling state interest in such classifications."8 Since the state had
failed to substantiate a compelling state interest, the court declared that
the absence of a right of jury trial in the recommitment procedures de-
nied the petitioner a fundamental right and constituted a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Inherent in the court's decision was the acceptance of petitioner's
theory that the recommitment proceedings were part of a comprehensive
55. Petitioner's Brief for a Hearing at 9, In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d
1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
56. 5 Cal. 3d at 305-07, 486 P.2d at 1208-09, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 8-9. In effect,
the court has lightened the burden on the party contesting the classification on the
basis that such classification is arbitrary and unreasonable by placing the burden on
the state to demonstrate a compelling interest in the classification. Of course, the
presumption of constitutionality of the statute still exists. The court merely re-
quires the state to assist in the close scrutiny that is applied to a discrimination that
involves a fundamental right.
57. For a good discussion of the definition of fundamental interest see Develop-
nents in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, at 1130 (1969), where
the writer explains: "It is difficult to articulate a general formula to distinguish inter-
ests regarded as 'fundamental' from other interests for purposes of the equal protection
clause. . . . In some contexts, an individual suffers severe detriment when he is not
treated as well as others are treated, just as in some contexts an individual may suffer
severe detriment when the treatment he receives, regardless of that given to others,
falls below a certain absolute standard. Thus there is an obvious analogy to formula-
tions of 'due process' based on common perceptions of 'fundamental fairness' or 'or-
dered libtery' or the traditions of Anglo-American peoples. . . . Probably every interest
found to be fundamental and therefore protected by the due process clause will also be
fundamental under the equal protection clause, so that unequal treatment with respect
to that interest would be upheld only on a very strong showing of justification."
58. 5 Cal. 3d at 306, 486 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 9. The court ex-
plained: "Although normally any rational connection between distinctions drawn by a
statute and the legitimate purpose thereof will suffice to uphold the statute's constitu-
tionality [citation omitted] closer scrutiny is afforded a statute which affects funda-
mental interests or employs a suspect classification [citations omitted]. In such cases
the state bears the burden of establishing both that the state has a compelling interest
which justifies the law and that the distinction is necessary to further that purpose." Id.
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statutory framework of commitment proceedings. The state had
argued that other commitment proceedings within this general statutory
scheme did not provide the right of jury trial59 The court rejected
this argument, however, and held that the state could not meet its bur-
den of showing a compelling state interest for denying the right of trial
by jury to Youth Authority wards on the premise that other commit-
ment proceedings contained similar discriminatory provisions. 60
In support of its decision, the court cited a United States Supreme
Court case, Baxstrom v. Herold,61 in which a mentally ill New York
state prisoner was committed to an institution for the mentally disor-
dered. 62 In the commitment proceedings, which applied only to per-
sons already incarcerated, the New York court determined that the pris-
oner would be committed for further care after the expiration of his
prison term. The pertinent commitment statute was the only civil pro-
ceeding in New York where the issue of sanity was not submitted to
a jury for consideration.6" The prisoner appealed his commitment
contending he was entitled to a jury trial, and the Supreme Court con-
cluded:
It follows that the State, having made [a jury trial] generally
available on this issue, may not, consistent with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arbitrarily withhold
it from some.
[T]here is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the com-
mitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from
all other civil commitments.
64
Extension of Jury Trials to Juveniles through
the Equal Protection Clause
The California Supreme Court's analysis in In re Gary W. clearly
establishes that the equal protection clause and similar California con-
stitutional provisions require jury trials to be included as part of the re-
commitment proceedings of the Youth Authority.65 However, the
reasoning of the court in In re Gary W. raises a question not discussed
by the court-whether the holding of the court is to be limited only to
recommitment proceedings, or whether it is also applicable to other
civil commitment proceedings within the statutory commitment system
so as to compel a right to trial by jury in all proceedings which involve
59. Id. at 308, 486 P.2d at 1210, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
60. Id.
61. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
62. Id. at 108-11.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 111-12.
65. 5 Cal. 3d at 308, 486 P.2d at 1210, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
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involuntary commitment. The applicability of In re Gary W. could
be brought into question in a case involving the right of trial by jury
for juvenile court proceedings or in a civil commitment proceeding for
one who is mentally retarded.66  The following discussion will briefly
review the effect of In re Gary W. on the question of a jury trial for
juveniles. Before beginning the examination of the juvenile's right to
jury trial in light of In re Gary W., a brief history of the extension of
procedural protections to minors in juvenile court proceedings may add
some perspective to the discussion.
Prior Case Law and the Due Process Argument
Since In re Gault"7 there has been an unceasing assault upon
the basic procedural foundations of juvenile court systems. In rapid
succession most of the rights accorded criminal defendants have been
extended to juveniles in the adjudicative phase of the proceedings where
commitment was a possible consequence. 8
Even prior to In re Gault, however, California, unlike most states,
had incorporated a comprehensive scheme of procedural protections for
the juvenile into its juvenile law. 69 Such basic protections as prelimi-
nary detention hearings, right to counsel, appointment of counsel for
indigents, mandatory records of proceedings, and sealing of records
had been provided in California as early as 1961.0 Although the ju-
venile has never been given a statutory right to jury trial in California,
the question has been before the California courts a number of times. 7'
66. See notes 25, 43 & accompanying text supra.
67. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
68. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971). The court in McKei-
ver listed the most significant of these rights, "the rights to appropriate notice, to
counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination and the privilege against self-incrim-
ination. Included, also, is the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
69. See notes 42, 43 & accompanying text supra.
70. Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law, CAL. WELF. & INST'N CODE §§ 500-
914 (West 1966).
71. In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 323-31, 228 P. 467, 468-71 (1924); In re
Joe R., 12 Cal. App. 3d 80, 84-85, 90 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532 (1970); In re Steven C.,
9 Cal. App. 3d 255, 260-61, 88 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99-100 (1970); In re R.L., 83 Cal.
Rptr. 81, 85 (1970); racated and remanded in light of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970); In re T.R.S., 1 Cal. App. 3d 178, 181-82, 81 Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 (1969);
People v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 743, 289 P.2d 303, 304 (1955); In re Brodie.
33 Cal. App. 751, 752-53, 166 P. 605, 606 (1917). Other jurisdictions haxe also
denied jury trial by judicial decision. Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 83, 121 A. 678,
682 (1923); Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 316, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1959)
(dictum); In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 278, 184 A.2d 449, 451 (1962).
At least 25 states deny the right to jury trial in juvenile courts by statute.
ALA. CoDE tit. 13, § 369 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1971); DEl_. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 1175 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.09(2) (1961); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-2420 (1971); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 571-41 (1968); IDAHO CODE
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The courts have repeatedly relied on the theory-expounded by Jus-
tice Richards in In re Daedler- 72 that the right to trial by jury is a re-
quirement of due process only in criminal proceedings.
Under this theory, the fact that juvenile court proceedings are
statutorily characterized as noncriminal in nature negates any obliga-
tion by the state under due process to afford juveniles the right to trial
by jury.73 This so-called "civil-label" theory has been the primary
stumbling block to those who have sought to extend the right to a jury
trial to juvenile proceedings.74 For example, In re Steven C.,r5 a 1970
California appellate decision, sets out the existing California law on
the question of jury trial in juvenile proceedings:
§ 16-1813 (Supp. 1971); IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-3215 (Supp. 1971); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 232.27 (1969); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.060 (1971); LA. REv. STAT. § 13:1579
(1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(1) (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-08
(1953); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.171(6) (1962) (equity practice controls); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 62.190(3) (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-35 (1952); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-285 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-18 (1960); OHIO Rv. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.35 (Page Supp. 1970); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.498(1) (1969); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 247 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1095.19 (Supp. 1971); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 55-10-94 (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 651(a) (Supp. 1971);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.030 (1962).
The following states have statutorily extended the right to jury trial to at least
some juvenile court proceedings: COLO. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 37-8-2 (1963); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1971); MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 712A.17 (1968);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-604.1 (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1110
(Supp. 1971); S.D. COmP. LAWS § 26-8-31 (1967); TExAs REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1
(13)(b) (1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.25(2)
(Supp. 1971); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.24 (Supp. 1971); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN.
§ 16-2307 (1966).
72. 194 Cal. 320, 332, 228 P. 467, 472 (1924).
73. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 503 (West 1966): "An order adjudging a
minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a
crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a
criminal proceeding."
74. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789-90, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952).
The Contreras decision marked the beginning of the courts questioning the "civil
label" concept of juvenile courts in California. In Contreras the court noted: "While
the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the
court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime, nevertheless, for all practical
purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence
to reason. COurts cannot and will not shut their eyes and ears to everyday con-
temporary happenings.
"It is common knowledge that such an adjudication when based upon a charge of
committing an act that amounts to a felony, is a blight upon the character of and is
a serious impediment to the future of such minor... . And further, as in this case,
the minor is taken from his family, deprived of his liberty, and confined to a state in-
stitution.. . . [N]ever should it [the Juvenile Court Act] be made an instrument for
the denial to a minor of a constitutional right or of a guarantee afforded by law to an
adult." (emphasis added).
75. 9 Cal. App. 3d 255, 88 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1970).
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The recent United States Supreme Court decisions which have
declared that juveniles are entitled, under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, to due process protection in juvenile court proceedings . ..
have not extended such protection to include the right to a jury
trial . ..
In other jurisdictions a number of cases have held that a
jury trial is required in juvenile proceedings. The California rule
. . . is that a juvenile is not entitled to a jury trial. . . . The
rationale of the California cases is that the Constitution does not
require the full panoply of rights accorded adults accused of crime
be extended to juveniles since to do so would introduce a strong
tone of criminality in juvenile proceedings.76
Thus, judicial precedent in California would appear to conclusively
preclude a minor from successfully demanding a right to jury trial based
on an analogy with rights accorded criminal defendants under due
process requirements. Quite recently, the question of a minor's con-
stitutional right to a jury trial was again brought before the United
States Supreme Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.77 In that case the
contention of the petitioners was that the right to jury trial is required
because the juvenile court proceedings are "substantially similar to a
criminal trial."7 8  The Court, however, held that the standard of due
process in juvenile court cases is less stringent than the due process re-
quirements in criminal trials. The Court noted that Duncan v. Louisi-
ana79 had obligated the states to provide jury trials in all criminal cases
because "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the Ameri-
can scheme of justice."8" In juvenile court proceedings, however, the
applicable due process standard is "fundamental fairness," which in-
cludes only those rights absolutely necessary to a fair trial. The Court
in McKeiver held that the right of a jury trial is not an absolute require-
ment to ensure a fair trial, and the states are therefore not obligated to
provide jury trials in juvenile proceedings because of the more limited
standard of "fundamental fairness."81  The Court concluded that the
right to a jury trial for juveniles was not constitutionally required un-
der the due process clause.8"
The Equal Protection Argument
Although the Court in McKeiver has now apparently silenced fu-
ture due process arguments as the basis for extending jury trial to ju-
veniles, the Court noted in passing that the states had always had it
76. Id. at 260-61, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
77. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
78. Id. at 541.
79. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
80. Id. at 149.
81. 403 U.S. at 543.
82. Id. at 545.
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within their power to include such a right in their statutory provisions.88
When the legislature has seen fit to grant the right to jury trial in civil
commitment proceedings involving certain minors, denial of a jury trial
to minors in other civil commitment proceedings involves the consti-
tutional issue of equal protection rather than due process.
In In re Gary W. the appellant established that the recommit-
ment proceedings of the Youth Authority were a part of an overall in-
voluntary commitment scheme. 4 As has been previously discussed, 5
commitment proceedings under the juvenile law are also a part of this
same involuntary commitment scheme, and they have the same gen-
eral purpose and intent as the other commitment statutes.8 6 Civil com-
mitment of a juvenile to the California Youth Authority is viewed as a
beneficial alternative to criminal proceedings in conformance with the
stated public policy "to protect society . . . by substituting for retri-
butive punishment. . . training and treatment" for the rehabilitation of
young persons.8 7 The statutory language of the juvenile commitment
statutes lends credence to the view that juvenile proceedings are merely
another form of involuntary civil commitment:
When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground
that he is a person described by section 602, the court. . . may
commit the minor to the Youth Authority. 8
Thus, the argument can certainly be made that juvenile court pro-
ceedings fall into the general statutory classification of involuntary civil
proceedings which are designed primarily for rehabilitation and care of
the individual committed and the protection of the public. In addition,
the previous discussion of the voluntary commitment statutes pointed
out that the juvenile court may commit minors to the Youth Authority
without a trial by jury.' The anomaly in the various commitment stat-
utes is highlighted by the fact that a minor would be entitled to a jury
trial if he were to be committed as an imminently dangerous person,
inebriate, mentally disordered sex offender, gravely disabled person,
narcotics addict, or a person who might be suicidal. 90
83. Id. at 547.
84. See notes 32-37 & accompanying text supra.
85. See notes 53-56 & accompanying text supra.
86. Id.
87. See note 53 supra.
88. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 731 (West 1966).
89. See note 43 & accompanying text supra.
90. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6318 (West Supp. 1971) provides in part:
"If a person ordered ...to be committed as a mentally disordered sex offender...
or any friend in his behalf, is dissatisfied with the order of the judge so committing
him, he may, within 15 days after the making of such order, demand that the question
of his being a mentally disordered sex offender be tried by a judge or by a jury in the
Superior Court of the county in which he was so committed." (emphasis added).
Id. § 5302 provides in part: "At the time of filing a petition for post-certification
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In In re Gary W., the petitioner was successful because he was able
to demonstrate to the court that a right to trial by jury was "generally
available" in other civil involuntary commitment proceedings under Cal-
ifornia law, but had been omitted by the legislature in the case of the
recommitment proceedings. 91 This omission was found by the court to
be a denial of equal protection.9 2  Similarly, minors are amenable to
those particular civil commitment proceedings where the right to a jury
trial is available.93 Since the legislature has omitted the right to trial
by jury in juvenile court proceedings,94 the argument can be made that
such an omission constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the
laws to juveniles, by analogy to the arguments which were presented in
In re Gary W.
Of course, the court in In re Gary W. did not decide that the leg-
islature may never discriminate in the case of fundamental rights, but
did conclude that
In such cases the state bears the burden of establishing both that
the state has a compelling interest which justifies the law and
that the distinction is necessary to further that purpose. 95
Therefore, if the analogy of a juvenile proceeding and the recommitment
proceeding in In re Gary W. is accepted by the court, the state must es-
tablish a compelling interest in maintaining a statutory classification
which grants the right of jury trial to some minors while withholding it
from others. In order to demonstrate this compelling interest the state
may contend that the minor demanding a jury trial in juvenile court pro-
ceedings has a less significant interest to protect than the minor who is
granted a jury trial in other commitment proceedings.9 6 The state
treatment [for persons imminently dangerous due to inebriation, suicidal or grave
disability] the court shall advise the person named in the petition of his right to be
represented by an attorney and of his right to demand a jury trial." (emphasis added).
Id. § 3108 provides in part: "If the person so committed [for narcotics addiction]
or any friend in his behalf is dissatisfied with the order of commitment, he may
within 10 days after the making of such order, file a written demand that the question
of his addiction or imminent danger of addiction be tried by a jury in the superior
court of the county in which he was committed." (emphasis added).
91. 5 Cal. 3d at 308, 486 P.2d at 1210, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
92. Id.
93. See note 26 & accompanying text supra.
94. See note 43 & accompanying text supra.
95. 5 Cal. 3d at 306, 486 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
96. These other commitment proceedings the state would explain are not al-
ternative propositions. Rather, they are the primary scheme for the care and treat-
ment of persons falling within their control. The state could conclude that it is quite
practical to grant to those persons in the latter category more protections than juve-
nile court participants, notwithstanding the fact that both categories are civil pro-
ceedings, with commitment as a possible consequence. The premise on which this
conclusion is based is that the interest of the minor seeking protections in the juvenile
court is less substantial than the interest of those persons in the primary commit-
[Vol. 23
February 1972] JURY TRIAL FOR JUVENILES
might also argue that the unique and beneficial character of juvenile
court proceedings is sufficient justification for the legislature to deprive
a juvenile court participant of the fundamental right to a jury trial
while granting the same right in most of the other civil commitment
proceedings to which the same minor would be amenable. In all prob-
ability, therefore, the state would contend that the juvenile court par-
ticipant has a lesser interest to protect relatively, and that denial of a
right to jury trial would not violate equal protection under the law.
Although the concept that there are "relative interests" involved
may result in the upholding of legislative classifications in ordinary
equal protection cases, 97 when fundamental rights are involved, this type
ment scheme, since the juvenile court system was created as a beneficial alternative
to the criminal system. See R. PouND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 134-35
(1923). The juvenile court system is intended, so the argument goes, to protect the
minor from the rigors of a criminal proceeding and the lasting effect of imprisonment
in a penal institution. In essence the state is required to prove that the creation of
the juvenile courts was for the benefit of the minor and was not constitutionally re-
quired. Therefore the minor who has received this special benefit has no real
ground to insist that every protection be made available to him. Cf. Norvell v. Illinois,
373 U.S. 420, 423 (1913) ("Exact equality is no prerequisite of equal protection of
the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 356 (1962); People v. Shipnov, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 232, 397 P.2d 993, 996, 42
Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1965). For an insight into society's changing attitudes towards juve-
nile offenders see Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HA{v. L REv. 104 (1909). "Why is
it not just and proper to treat these juvenile offenders, as we deal with the neglected
children, as a wise and merciful father handles his own child whose errors are not
discovered by the authorities? Why is it not the duty of the state, instead of asking
merely whether a boy or a girl has committed a specific offense, to find out what he
is, physically, mentally, morally, and then if it learns that he is treading the path that
leads to criminality, to take him in charge not so much to punish, as to reform, not to
degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a
worthy citizen." Id. at 107. The theory that the juvenile courts are beneficial to the
minor has been seriously criticized. Mr. Justice Fortas gave the following depressing
assessment of the juvenile court system: "[A minor] is committed to an institution
where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional conse-
quence-and of limited practical meaning-that the institution of which he is com-
mitted is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however eu-
phemistic the title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an insti-
tution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time.
His world becomes a 'building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and insti-
tutional hours. . . .' Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and
friends and classmates, his world is people by guards, custodians, state employees, and
'delinquents' confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide."
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (footnotes omitted). See also In re Urbasek,
38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967), where the court concluded: "When we eschew
legal fictions and adopt a realistic view of the consequences that attach to a determina-
tion of delinquency and a commitment to a juvenile detention home, 'juvenile quar-
ters' in a jail or a State institution . . . we can neither truthfully nor fairly say that
such an institution is devoid of penal characteristics." Id. at 541, 232 N.E.2d at 719.
97. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)s
JURY TRIAL FOR JUVENILESFebruary 19721
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of justification for a discriminatory classification will not be accepted
by the California courts.98 Admittedly, the courts have recognized that
differing interests which may be involved may be a rational distinction
upon which the state may enact statutes which discriminate among
members of the same class.99 However, when fundamental rights are
involved, a mere showing by the state that there is a rational distinc-
tion for the discriminatory provisions, will find a court less ready to al-
low the statutory classifications. The state is required to show more
than a difference of relative interests to give validity to the classifica-
tion and must demonstrate a "compelling interest" in order for the
court to allow the classification.'"°
Conclusion
The language of In re Gary W. would appear to provide support
for the view that all commitment statutes are part of the same general
scheme characterized generally as provisions "leading to the commit-
ment of various classes of people for treatment or to protect society."
Neither In re Gary W. nor the commitment statutes would indicate
that there is any inherent distinction to be drawn between the recom-
mitment proceedings, the juvenile court proceedings or the other com-
mitment proceedings. The broad language of the court referring to
the California involuntary commitment system indicates that the court
viewed all of the commitment proceedings as part of the same general
legislative classification in determining whether the petitioner had been
denied the equal protection of the laws.
This note has attempted to demonstrate that the decision in In re
Gary W. would provide a suitable framework for extending the right to
jury trial to minors in the adjudicative phase of juvenile court proceed-
ings. A brief recapitulation of the reasoning which could be used to
argue for that result will be set forth below. In In re Gary W. the court
expressed no opinion as to the practical considerations of a jury trial in
where the Supreme Court upheld a municipal regulation which prohibited advertising
for profit on an individual's commercial vehicle. The purpose of this statute was to
cut down on traffic distractions and in this way promote highway safety. The
court admitted that the statute discriminated against those persons advertising for
profit while it had no effect upon those persons advertising their own business on
their own business vehicle. The court was unable to find an obvious basis for this
distinction. Rather, they looked to the relatively higher interest of one to advertise
his own business on his own vehicle as compared with the relatively lower interest of
one to advertise for profit on his own vehicle. Id. at 116 (Jackson, J., concurring).
98. E.g., In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 307, 486 P.2d 1201, 1210, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 10 (1971).
99. See note 96 supra.
100. In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 307, 486 P.2d 1201, 1210, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1,
10 (1971).
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the recommitment proceedings. Rather, the court looked to the legisla-
ture as its guide and held that since the legislature had decided that the
fundamental right of a jury trial was necessary to protect a party in a
commitment proceeding, this same protection must be given in all com-
mitment proceedings. Unless the state can demonstrate a compelling
interest in maintaining the discriminatory classification, the equal pro-
tection clause requires the fundamental right in question to be extended
to all similar proceedings.
Many practical considerations are often advanced as reasons for
keeping juries out of juvenile court proceedings. 1' These range from
the possibility of administrative confusion and unnecessary delay to the
fear of the complete disintegration of the so-called informality of the
system. But were not these same problems present when the right to a
jury trial was incorporated into the other commitment statutes? In
view of the many current attacks on the arbitrary manner in which mi-
nors are confined under the present juvenile system, it would appear
improbable that the California courts will continue to accept the fiction
that denial of the right to jury trial is for the benefit of the minor.
Should the court accept the analogy between In re Gary W. and the ju-
venile commitment proceedings, the state will probably find it difficult
to justify providing a jury trial to juveniles in one commitment proceed-
ing because it is deemed necessary for his protection, and not providing
a jury trial to a minor in another commitment proceeding because it is
for his benefit that the right is denied. Therefore, none of the above
considerations appears to qualify as a compelling state interest.
For those who have long advocated jury trials in juvenile court
proceedings, In re Gary W. provides a novel approach to this much
litigated question. The case seems to have reopened the door to the
issue of a minor's constitutional right to a jury trial within three weeks
of the decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania which appeared to have
conclusively closed it. If Gary W. had been a minor in a juvenile court
proceeding, and the court had discussed and compared the same statutes,
101. For a discussion of the changing attitude toward the extension of jury trials
to juveniles see Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juve-
nile Cases, 1966 Sup. Cr. REV. 167. "It is probably true that some of the adult pro-
tections that the reformers sought to avoid could be introduced into the juvenile court
without completely hampering its operation. The right to a jury trial is preserved in
some states and the juvenile courts still function with jury trials, although, in fact, the
right is usually waived. A constitutional right to public trial has rarely been invoked.
If a child properly advised by parents and counsel, wishes a public trial, why should
he not have it? In my view the reformers, in their desire to distinguish sharply be-
tween juvenile and criminal proceedings and in the hope that children would be
processed as patients in a clinic or given social education as in school, put too much
emphasis on the need for informal procedure. The child and his parents are under no
illusion. They know they are in court, not in school or at a doctor's office." Id. at 186.
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and had applied the same legal principles, the possibility exists that the
right to a jury trial for juveniles would now be part of the California
law. Whether a subsequent opportunity to provide juveniles with a
jury trial will be presented to the court or whether the California legis-
lature will supply this long needed relief by statute will be determined
in the future.
George A. Spadoro, Jr.*
* Member, Second Year Class.
